Introduction
Political scientists often teach a very idealized version of the congressional budget and appropriation process known as the "Regular Order." As codified in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the process should unfold in a very precise way. The president initiates the process by presenting a budget request for the following fiscal year on or before the first Monday in February. The action then moves to Congress where the House and Senate pass budget resolutions that contain spending allocations, known as 302(a), for each appropriation jurisdiction. According to the textbook, the House and Senate then will use a conference committee to iron out any cross-chamber differences.
Following the passage of the budget resolution, appropriation committees formulate 302(b) suballocations for each subcommittee that then produces its own appropriation bill. These proposals come to floor as individual bills that contain only appropriations. Any HouseSenate differences in their respective appropriation bills are ironed out in conference. After conference reports are passed, the president signs them into law well before the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1.
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But over the past several years, the process is best described as the "Regular Disorder."
The president often misses the early February target for his budget request. With increasing frequency, the House and Senate fail to pass a budget resolution. Even when both chambers pass budget resolutions, conference committees are rarely convened so that the differences between the two resolutions are never reconciled. Over the past decade, very few appropriations bills have passed before the beginning of the fiscal year. More commonly, governmental activities are funded for many months through continuing resolutions (CRs). Occasionally, all federal spending for an entire year is provided under CRs. When appropriation bills do pass, they are often packaged together as omnibus bills that are nego-tiated by party leaders and the president, thus circumventing the role of the appropriation committees. These omnibus bills have increasingly become vehicles for non-appropriation legislative initiatives.
In this chapter, I examine trends in what I will call the procedural fiscal performance of Congress and the president. In doing so, I evaluate several hypotheses about why the regular order in Congressional budgeting and appropriations has fallen into disuse. While the question has many angles and dimensions, I consider three aspects. Finally, I take up the question of the extent to which the decline of regular order has affected fiscal outcomes. Has the more irregular process undermined the ability of Congress and the President to manage the government's finances? Has it created more policy uncertainty that detracts from government performance and spooks private economic actors?
Some Hypotheses
There has been very little systematic work exploring why adherence to the regular order in fiscal policy making has declined so markedly. Many scholars, however, have noted substantial changes in a wide array of congressional practices that can be attributed to heightened levels of partisanship and ideological conflict in Congress.
2 But most of this work has focused on general legislative procedures and has not focused specifically on budget and appropriations processes.
In fact, there has been relatively little recent work on Congressional budget and appropriation politics. An important exception is Woon and Anderson (2012) who study the determinants of the timing of the passage of appropriation bills. Their focus, however, is using appropriation delay to test the implications of several policy bargaining models whereas mine is on how congressional performance has changed over time. Nevertheless, their study is extremely useful in addressing the declining adherence to the regular order. In a recent paper, (Hanson 2013) argues that the Senate leaders of weak majority parties will depart from the regular order by combing several appropriation bills into an omnibus package. Such a maneuver helps insulate the package from minority party amendments. He does not, however, connect his theory to the central concern of this paper -delayed passage of appropriation bills.
4 See (Cameron 2000) and (Cameron and McCarty 2004) for a discussion and other applications of policy bargaining with incomplete information.
5 See Krehbiel (1998) and McCarty (2007) .
appropriation bills. They argue such procedures contain enforced spending caps that reduce the discretion of Congressional majorities and appropriators. With less discretion, there are fewer incentives to engage in the tough negotiation strategies that lead to bargaining failure and delays. Below I will reexamine these hypotheses and explore whether they help account for changing congressional procedural fiscal performance.
I am unaware of any work in political science which examines whether procedural fiscal performance has a significant impact on fiscal outcomes such as spending levels or deficits.
Despite popular concern about the impact of congressional dysfunction, the relationship between appropriation delays and fiscal outcomes is not clear. Because delayed appropriation bills generally lead to continuing resolutions that maintain spending at the previous year's level, delays in the passage of appropriation bills may have a dampening impact on spending and deficits. Alternatively, failures in appropriation bargaining might be symptomatic of strongly divergent spending priorities that can only be reconciled by higher levels of aggregate spending. McCubbins (1991) , for example, argues that divided government combined with the clash of Republican priorities of tax cuts and defense spending and Democratic demands for social spending contributed to the large deficits of the 1980s.
A potential effect of budgetary dysfunction is the uncertainty that it creates for the economy. Baker et al. (2014) show that their measure of economic policy uncertainty has grown markedly over the past fifty years, more or less in tandem with increased levels of partisan polarization. They speculate that policy uncertainty and polarization are linked through the effect of polarization on the "capacity of policy makers to address pressing problems." Plausibly, delayed passage of appropriation bills may be one of the links between polarization and economic uncertainty. Unfinished appropriations may result in uncertainty about aggregate government spending and deficits as well as adverses effects industries that are heavily dependent on government contracts.
I now turn to documenting the trends in procedural fiscal performance, investigating the hypotheses behind its deterioration, and evaluating its consequences.
Budget Proposals
In this section, I examine historical trends in the timing of presidential budget proposals and congressional budget resolutions. Currently, presidents are required to make budget proposals before the first Monday in February. That deadline has varied over time, however.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 set a deadline of the first day of the regular congressional session. 6 In the 1950s the deadline was changed to be proposed in the first 15 days of the session. In the 1980s, the deadline was moved up to the first Monday after January 3, but in 1990 the current rule of the first Monday in February was established. 7 The only exception was FY1955 when President Eisenhower missed the deadline by a single day. 1924 1932 1940 1948 1956 1964 1972 1980 1996 2004 2012 Delay in Submission of President's Budget and so are unlikely causes of the longer term breakdown in the budget and appropriations process. Under the Obama Administration, however, an older pattern of delayed midsession reviews was revived.
The Budget Resolution
After the president submits a budget, both chambers of Congress go to work on a budget resolution. Under "regular" order, both chambers pass resolutions and the differences are reconciled by a conference committee. 10 See Lynch (2013) for a discussion of the FY2011 budget politics.
Appropriation Bills
Under the "regular order," appropriators go to work to allocate funds according to the budget resolution.
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If appropriation bills are not passed by the beginning of the fiscal year, Congress and the president must agree to a continuing resolution (CR) or face a government shutdown such as the ones that occurred in 1995-1996 and 2013. Generally, CRs continue the funding levels of the previous fiscal year, but many also include some modifications of spending levels. CRs often contain changes to the authorizing statutes, and because they are often "must" pass legislation, unrelated legislation is often attached.
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Consequently, delays in the passage of appropriation bills and the resulting "governing by CR" has drawn wide concern. Late appropriation bills are said to create budgetary uncertainty for government agencies and private actors, reduce the ability to adjust to new spending priorities, undermine the role of committee expertise, and weaken fiscal governance.
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In this section, I consider the factors that lead to delayed passage of appropriation bills. Woon and Anderson (2012) conduct a very similar analysis, but the analyses differ in substantial ways reflecting different research concerns. Woon and Anderson (2012) use delay in appropriations to test a general theory of policy bargaining, whereas I am primarily concerned with explaining longer term changes in congressional behavior. Nevertheless, I
draw heavily on their insights.
11 If a chamber has not passed its budget resolution, it may pass a "deeming resolution" which contains temporary 302(a) allocations. See Lynch (2013) . In 2011, the Senate passed neither a budget nor a deeming resolution.
12 See Tollestrup (2013) p. 21 and White (1988) . 13 See White (1988) , Devins (1988) and Hanson (2013) .
Appropriation Delays
To measure the trends in the propensity to begin a fiscal year without completed appropriation bills, I compiled data on each regular appropriation bill for FY1974 to FY2013 from http://thomas/loc.gov and http://www.gpo.gov. To measure delay, I simply compare the date of final passage with the start date of the fiscal year. I consider an appropriation bill to have passed if it is signed by the president as a stand-alone appropriation bill or as a separate title of an omnibus appropriation bill. Thus, I do not count continuing resolutions that set fund levels for the remainder of the fiscal year. This is a departure from Woon and Anderson (2012) . Because they are interested in measuring the duration of bargaining, they sensibly count year-long CRs as the culmination of the negotiations for the fiscal year. I, on the other hand, am interested in compliance with the regular order.
So it is important to draw a distinction between passing appropriation bills and finishing the fiscal year under a CR. There are, however, some difficult coding decisions. In FY1987 and FY1988, omnibus appropriation bills were passed in the form of a CR so that changes to authorizing legislation to be included. I continue to count these as CRs rather than successful appropriation bills since the procedures deviated from the regular order.
My data is based on 512 possible appropriation bills from FY1974 to FY2013. 14 Of these, 408 were passed as stand-alone or omnibus appropriation bills. That leaves 104
"failures" -appropriation jurisdictions that were funded by CRs for the entire fiscal year.
Figures 4 and 5 present the distribution of appropriation delays in months.
15 Figure 4 presents the data for the entire sample. Appropriation delays are the norm. Fewer than 15% of all appropriation bills passed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. The modal month of passage is during the third month of the fiscal year (currently December). But a substantial share of bills pass in months 4, 5 and 6.
14 There were 13 possible appropriation bills from FY1974 to FY2005 and 12 from FY2006 to FY2013. 15 In both figures, a delay of zero is assigned to any bill passed prior to the start of the fiscal year. Over the past few years, there have been very few months for which more than 40% of the appropriation bills were in effect. But the figure also demonstrates that the current period of poor performance is not unprecedented. Delayed appropriation bills were also quite common in the 1980s.
16
These non-monotonic trends suggest that the current difficulties are more than simply a reflection of longer term trends such as partisan polarization.
Not surprisingly, these patterns of late appropriation bills generate patterns in the usage of continuing resolutions. But as Figure 7 shows there are substantial differences in the 16 The number of months without appropriation bills in the 1980s is clearly increased by my decision not to treat the spending packages of FY1987 and FY1988 as successful appropriation bills. But because those packages were substantially delayed, the figure would not look qualitatively different if I treated those cases as omnibus appropriations rather than year-long CRs. usages of CRs that are not quite accounted for by delayed appropriation bills. In the 1970s, CRs were less numerous but longer than those of recent years. This reflects the fact that CRs were more often used as a mechanism for crafting omnibus legislation that included appropriation and authorization legislation than as stop-gap measures when appropriation bills were not passed on time. In the 1990s, the low point for appropriation delays, CRs were frequent but very short in nature. But over the past decade, CRs were frequently employed and have increased markedly in duration. From FY1991 through FY2002, the median CR lasted only 7 days. Since FY 2003, the median has been 21 days. To capture time dependence in a flexible way, I include fixed effects for each month of the fiscal year. These fixed effects capture the baseline "hazard rates" for each month independent of the covariates. 17 I also include fixed effects for each appropriation jurisdiction.
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17 My approach, therefore, is roughly equivalent to the Cox Proportional Hazard model. 18 The jurisdiction fixed effects help control for how the content and programs in each area may induce more or less conflict in bargaining. See Woon and Anderson (2012) .
Preference Divergence
Woon and Anderson (2012) present a formal model and evidence that demonstrates that appropriation bills are more likely to be delayed as a result of divergent preferences across those who are negotiating. I will measure preference divergence in two ways. First, I use "common space" DW-NOMINATE to compute measures of the preference differences across chambers and branches.
19 I use four separate measures: the average distance between the House and Senate, the average distance between the House and President, the average distance between the Senate and President, and the maximum of these distances. As a robustness check, I also use partisan indicators for preference divergence using measures such as divided government and split party control of Congress. To capture the possibility that the partisan indicators might represent greater divergence in recent years due to partisan polarization, I interact them with polarization measured as the average distance between the two parties in the House on the common space DW-NOMINATE scores.
Budgetary Enforcement Rules
Budget enforcement rules may also play a role in congressional performance on appropriations. Rules may support prompt action on appropriations in a variety of ways. Rules that reduce the discretion of appropriators may serve to minimize the probability of bargaining failure by reducing the scope of conflict. Internal procedures may also provide incentives for appropriation committees to be first-or last-movers depending on enforcement rules.
I test for the effects of two different budget enforcement regimes. The first is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known by the names of its Senate co-sponsors Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH). The key mechanism underlying GRH was specified deficit targets enforced by cross-the-board sequester. As a deficit cut- 
Fiscal and Economic Conditions
The timing of appropriation bills may also be influenced by current fiscal and economic conditions. Large deficits may increase the salience of conflicts over spending priorities and contribute to delayed passage. Conversely, periods of economic growth produce more resources for the government and may lessen conflict over spending. To capture these effects, I include two variables: the federal budget deficit from the previous year and the GDP growth rate from the previous quarter. My expectation is that deficits reduce the likelihood of passage in a given month while GDP growth increases it.
The President
I also include a number of controls to capture the presidential impact on the process. As discussed above, presidents may be responsible for poor procedural performance by delaying budgetary submissions and reports. So I include two variables measuring the number of days the administration misses the deadline for the initial budget proposal and the deadline for the mid-session review.
23 Clearly, however, one must be careful in interpreting the correlations between these variables and delayed appropriations as causal. Presidents may delay proposals and reports based on expectations of conflict or there may be omitted variables correlated with both delayed presidential action and delayed congressional action.
Presidential transitions may also affect the procedural fiscal performance. Such transitions may be times of greater than normal policy change which may generate more conflict and complexity in fiscal policy making. But transitions may also correspond to presidential "honeymoons" where deference to presidential priorities might facilitate quicker action on appropriations. While I lack a clear prediction about the direction of the correlation, I include an indicator for the first fiscal year of a new presidential administration. For similar considerations, I also include an indicator for the six months prior to a presidential election. Tables 1 and 2 Table 2 presents results from the party model which are quite complementary. In model 6, the presence of a split party Congress or divided government reduces the likelihood of successful passage. If an appropriation bill has a monthly probability of passage of .5 under a single party congress (unified government), it has only a .28 (.33) probability under split party control (divided government). Party polarization is also associated with a reduction in the likelihood of passage. An appropriation bill that passed with .5 at the minimum level of polarization is predicted to pass with probability of .30 at the maximum value. In model 7, I
Results
add an interaction between divided government and polarization. This coefficient suggests that polarization has enhanced the negative effect of divided government on procedural performance. 24 At the lowest level of polarization, the coefficient on divided government is a negligible -.144 (a .03 effect at a baseline of probability of .5). But at the maximum value of polarization, divided government leads to a .18 passage probability in situations where unified government would have produced a .5 monthly passage probability. Unlike the results using ideological distances, the estimated effects of party control and polarization are not very robust to inclusion of the measures for presidential budget delays (models 8 and 9). This suggests that at least part of the impact of divided government and polarization is produced by the president's behavior on the mid-session review.
I turn now to the findings on budget enforcement rules. Like Woon and Anderson (2012) , I find that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings procedures had no effect on procedural performance. But I find a large and robust impact of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act.
Based on these estimates, the effects of the BEA are large enough to raise the monthly passage probability from .5 to more than .8. But we must be concerned about the possibility that the BEA indicator is simply proxying for other unmeasured features of the 1990s.
To test this possibility, I consider a number of placebo dates by shifting the twelve year window forward and backward from the actual dates of FY1991 to FY2002. Based on the estimated log-likelihood and the magnitude of the placebo BEA coefficient, the best fitting twelve year window is FY1989 to FY2000. That the improved performance came before the BEA, suggests that factors other than the BEA may also have played a role in the procedural performance of the 1990s.
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The estimated effects of fiscal and economic conditions are also quite consistent across 24 Due to the multicollinearity generated by the interaction, the coefficient on the interaction effect falls just short of statistical significance. But divided government, polarization, and the interaction are highly significant jointly.
25 Importantly, when the dates are backshifted two years, they capture the last two years of the GRH regime. So it is also possible that GRH had a lagged effect on procedural performance. Standard errors in parentheses Probit models of the probability of successful passage of appropriation bill in month t conditional on not passing by end of month t-1. Month and jurisdicion indicators not reported. Standard errors in parentheses Probit models of the probability of successful passage of appropriation bill in month t conditional on not passing by end of month t-1. Month and jurisdiction indicators not reported.
the preference and party models. I find no evidence that the magnitude of the previous years surplus or deficit has any impact on the timing of appropriation bills. Economic growth, however, does correlate with good procedural performance. A one percent increase in the GDP growth rate from the previous quarter is sufficient to raise the monthly passage probability from .5 to .57. There is little evidence that performance is either promoted or impeded during the first fiscal year of a new administration. But Congress appears to be somewhat more efficient in the months surrounding presidential elections.
Finally, I turn to the evidence that presidential delays affect congressional performance.
Submission delays of the original budget do not slow down the timing of appropriations. In fact, there is a positive probability between the delay in initial submission and the monthly probability of passage (although the standard error of this estimate is large and the effect is not statistically significant). The delay in the mid-session report does have a negative and statistically significant effect. A one-standard deviation increase in the (log) delay is associated with a .10 drop in the monthly probability of passage if the baseline is .5. But I should repeat the caveat that such estimates may not reflect causal effects if both the president and Congress are responding to some omitted variable.
Does It Matter?
Despite recent concerns about Congress's recent proclivity to "govern by CR", there is little systematic evidence of its consequences on fiscal or economic outcomes. In this section, I provide some preliminary evidence for two possible effects. First, I examine whether procedural performance has any clear impact on Congress's ability to control fiscal outcomes such as spending or the deficit. Second, I consider whether poor procedural performance might create economic uncertainties that affect the broader economy. Of course, surpluses and deficits are functions both of spending and tax policy. So I now consider whether spending, the area most under the control of the appropriators, correlates with their performance. Figure 9 plots the bivarate relationship between annual change in total federal outlays (as a percentage of GDP) and the percentage of complete appropriation bills. Again there appears to be no strong relationship. This is confirmed by the regression results presented in Table 4 . The coefficient estimates show that spending decreases slightly when more appropriation bills are completed. But the estimates are very imprecise and not statistically significant.
While I do not report the results, the null findings hold even when spending is narrowed to changes in discretionary spending. I also considered whether poor procedural perfor- In summary, there is very little evidence that procedural performance has a systematic impact on fiscal outcomes (at least at the level of annual spending and deficit levels).
Policy Uncertainty
I now examine the suggestion of Baker et al. (2014) that governmental dysfunction contributes to policy uncertainty. To address this question, I use a measure of policy uncertainty developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) that utilizes media coverage of the economy. Their index is based on search results from ten large newspapers.
27 An article is treated as an indicator of policy uncertainty when it contains the term 'uncertainty' or 'uncertain', the terms 'economic' or 'economy' and one or more of the following terms:
27 The newspapers are the Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. 'congress', 'legislation', 'white house', 'regulation', 'federal reserve', or 'deficit.' Because this policy uncertainty index has been shown to correlate negatively with investment and economic performance, a connection between it and appropriation delays could indicate the macroeconomic costs of poor procedural budgetary performance. several periods of high economic uncertainty, the late 1980s and early 1990s, the period around 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraq Wars, and the period since the financial crisis. As we have seen, the first and third of these periods are also periods of procedural dysfunction.
So a correlation between delayed appropriations and uncertainty is plausible. Figure 11 explores this possibility by plotting the percentage of completed appropriation bills against the policy uncertainty measure. The lowess line shows a slight decline of uncertainty in months with a greater percentage of completed appropriation bills.
To investigate this relationship further, 
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In model 2, I add two additional variables. First, at the suggestion of Baker et al. (2014) I include the measure of congressional polarization to rule out the possibility that the effect of procedural performance is simply capturing the overall effect of political polarization.
Second, I control for the clear effects of international conflict on the uncertainty measure.
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The estimated coefficient on completed appropriation is slightly larger than that of model 1. The coefficient on polarization is also negative and statistically significant as predicted by Baker et al. (2014) . These findings indicate that polarization may have an effect on economic policy uncertainty beyond its effect on procedural performance. Not surprisingly, there is more economic policy uncertainty during periods in which the U.S. is involved in international conflicts.
Model 3 considers the possibility that it is the economic and fiscal factors associated with procedural performance that are driving economic policy uncertainty. Therefore, measures of the lagged budget surplus and the lagged quarterly GDP growth rate are added. The inclusion of these variables reduces the coefficient on completed appropriations significantly, but the effect size remains an economically meaningful difference of .2% of GDP between a fully-funded government and one operating on continuing resolutions. Baker et al (2013) In summary, there is some modest evidence that poor procedural performance enhances economic uncertainty substantially enough to have meaningful economic effects. But given the null results for an effect of procedural performance on objective fiscal policy outcomes, the nature of this uncertainty remains unclear. It may reflect uncertainty about very short run fiscal outcomes that I cannot capture in the annual time series, or it may be the psychological effect on economic actors of observing apparent government dysfunction.
Conclusions
Despite the current anxieties over how the Congress and the president are handling their fiscal policy responsibilities, political scientists have focused much less attention to longerterm trends in procedural performance on fiscal policy than they have on the performance for 9/11 and the Afghanistan invasion, and the first seven months of the Iraq War in 2003.
on judicial and executive branch nominations and general legislation. The primary goal of this chapter is to lay out some of the trends in procedural performance on fiscal policy and to lay the foundation for future research.
Several of the preliminary findings warrant more intensive future investigation. First, although there is ample evidence that partisan and ideological conflict impedes performance in the budget and appropriation process, my results demonstrate that there must be more to the story. Performance in the relatively less polarized 1980s was poor, it was excellent through much of the 1990s (with the notable exception of the 1995 government shutdown), and it has rapidly deteriorated over the past decade. Second, while the timing of the improved performance of the 1990s does not align exactly with the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the evidence is plausibly consistent with the beneficial effects of spending caps and pay-as-you go rules. Clearly, more work is needed to isolate these effects. Third, this chapter raises the crucial question of whether the propensity to govern by CR has significant effects on outcomes. While there are limitations to my analysis of the effects of appropriation delay on annual deficit and spending figures, the results do seem to rule out first-order effects on major fiscal aggregates. At the same time, I present some evidence consistent with an effect of procedural performance on the expectations of economic actors.
